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STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-10(l) (a) 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Respondent Mabbutt has misstated the issue on appeal. 
The issue is not whether the Industrial Commission complied with 
Price River Coal Company v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 
(Utah 1986), as respondent would like the Court to believe. 
Rather, the issues are as stated in petitioners' opening brief, 
namely, (a) whether there is sufficient factual foundation in the 
record to support the Administrative Law Judge's findings; (b) 
whether the Administrative Law Judge's decision was based on 
unreasonable inferences; (c) whether the Administrative Law Judge 
complied with Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(l)(a) requiring that the 
order of a presiding officer must include findings of fact based 
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative pro-
ceedings or on facts sufficient noted; and (d) whether the claim-
ant met her burden of proof by showing medical causation as 
required by Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986). 
Petitioners agree with respondent that another issue 
which must be decided on appeal is whether the Administrative Law 
Judge demonstrated extreme bias during the hearing, therefore 
mandating a new hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT HAS MISSTATED MANY FACTS IN THE 
RECORD. 
In her brief, respondent paints an unfair picture of 
what occurred on the day of Mr. Mabbutt's death. Respondent 
alleges that there was a spill of slurry that was accumulating in 
Mr. Mabbutt's work area on October 23, 1981, (Respondent's Brief 
at 9.) Respondent fails to point out that the slurry that was 
accumulating in Mr. Mabbutt's work area is intended to accumulate 
in the sump area and is not considered a spill. (See Court 
Record, Volume I at 129-130, 137.) 
Respondent contends that the fact that Mr. Mabbutt's 
work area had not been "rock dusted" could lead a person to the 
"reasonable" conclusion that Mr. Mabbutt was still carrying the 
heavy buckets and was also attempting to unplug the pump until 
his demise. (Respondent's Brief at 16.) There are many reasons 
why this is patently illogical and not a reasonable conclusion. 
First, it is well settled that the pump was in operative condi-
tion when Mr. Mabbutt's body was found and that the sump pump, 
when operative, can easily handle any accumulation of materials 
that gathers in the sump area. (See Court Record, Volume I at 
164-165.) Second, logic dictates that Mabbutt did not have 
enough time to clean up the accumulation of materials by carrying 
the materials in buckets to the belt line. This point is dis-
cussed at length in Section III of this Reply Memorandum, infra; 
pp. 9-13* 
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believe.'" (Respondent's Brief at 19.) Petitioners actually 
used the term "haughty and argumentative manner". (Petitioners1 
Opening Brief at 21.) Respondent further contends that, "[t]he 
Administrative Law Judge was attempting to clarify which exhibit 
appellants' counsel was referring to during his examination of 
the witness." Id. This contention is best refuted by quoting 
directly from the transcript. 
The Court: Well, [Exhibit D-12] doesn't 
say that. This says, "Comparison of peak 
activities (range) maximum garbage capacity; 
maximum luggage carry; minimum luggage carry; 
minimum garbage carry." It doesn't say — 
anywhere on here — say anything about any 
buckets of slurry. 
That's why I'm wondering what you're 
talking about. 
Answer [By Dr. Fowles]: Well, that's 
purely my oversight, since I — 
The Court: Well, can you mark that 
appropriately or something, so that it makes 
some sense — 
Mr. Elegante: Just write — 
The Court: — to those of us who aren't 
privy to the calculations, et cetera? 
I mean, so far, from what I've gleaned 
from your testimony and from the exhibits, 
you seem to be saying that carrying garbage 
and carrying luggage is more energy — you 
expend more energy doing that than you do 
carrying buckets and working in the mine. 
I think that's what you're saying. 
Isn't it? 
Answer: That's basically it. 
The Court: Okay. I find that hard to 
believe. But — 
That's why I'm having some problems with 
D-12. That doesn't clearly indicate to me 
what the studies or anything were. It just 
keeps talking about the garbage carry. Let 
me see if that makes any sense now. 
(See Court Record, Volume I at 195-196.) It is clear from 
reading the record that the Administrative Law Judge's comment in 
question was not designed to clarify which exhibit appellant's 
counsel was referring to. The Administrative Law Judge asked a 
question of the expert, the expert answered the question, and the 
Administrative Law Judge expressed his disbelief at the expert's 
answer. The Administrative Law Judge exhibited actual bias 
against petitioners and should have been disqualified. The 
Administrative Law Judge's decision, based on the evidence at the 
hearing should not be upheld by this Court or at the very least, 
this Court should remand the case for a new hearing. 
Finally, respondent argues that with respect to Dr. 
Bloswick's testimony, "it has been established that his assump-
tion and conclusions were based, to great degree, upon informa-
tion received from appellants' counsel, 0'Green and not from the 
record." (Respondent's Brief at 20.) First, it is not the 
proper role of respondent's counsel to arrive at the above-stated 
conclusion. That conclusion is clearly not established by the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order in that the Order fails to even 
mention the testimony of either John O'Green or Dr. Bloswick. 
(See Court Record, Volume I at 420-422.) Second, Dr. Bloswick 
points out in his own testimony that some of the information he 
used to put together Exhibit D-5 came from his personal review of 
the transcript and the exhibits in this case. (See Court Record, 
Volume I at 203-204.) Dr. Bloswick testified that discussions 
with Mr. O'Green and petitioners' counsel were only used to fill 
the gaps that he could not otherwise fill from the record. Id. 
II. THE RECENTLY DECIDED STEWARD CASE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT RESPONDENT'S POSITION. 
The facts of this Court's recent opinion in Workers' 
Compensation Fund v. Steward, Case No. 870418-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
Sept. 12, 1988)f are inapposite to the facts of the instant case. 
In Steward, the Court found that the claimant's death was compen-
sable within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act and 
affirmed the Industrial Commission's order. Steward supports 
petitioners' position in that it highlights the quantum of 
evidence necessary to compensate the spouse of a heart attack 
victim where the heart attack takes place during his work as 
opposed to the dearth of evidence in the instant case. 
In Steward, the Administrative Law Judge found that the 
claimant was subject to the following work-related stress fac-
tors: 
(1) anxiety caused by the late arrival of his 
truck delaying his departure from Salt Lake 
Cityf (2) fatigue from having to drive on 
slippery roads and during a snow storm, both 
to and from Denver, (3) fatigue from inade-
quate rest prior to his departure from 
Denver, and (4) the use of amphetamines, 
probably in greater amounts than usual 
because of the lack of rest. 
~fi-
Slip op. at 7. These work related stress factors are both 
quantifiable and tangible. The factors are not based on conjec-
ture or inferences, but rather, the Administrative Law Judge had 
the facts clearly before him. He had objective evidence that the 
claimant did not sleep "the entire night of November 10-11, 
1985", and that the claimant drove through a severe snow storm. 
Slip op. at 1-2. Presented with these facts on review, the Court 
ruled that there was competent evidence before the Administrative 
Law Judge to support his finding that the claimant's employment 
stress was both the legal and medical cause of the claimant's 
heart attack. 
In direct contrast to the Steward case, the Administra-
tive Law Judge's finding in the instant case relies upon only 
conjecture and inferences in an attempt to show that Mr. Mabbutt 
was under stress at the time of his death. In contrast to Mrs. 
Stewart, Mrs. Mabbutt testified that she did not notice anything 
unusual about her husband when he left for work the morning he 
died. (Respondent's Brief at p. 5.) In contrast to Steward, 
there is no solid evidence as to what Mr. Mabbutt did on the day 
of his death. As stressed so adamantly in Petitioners' Opening 
Brief in this appeal, no one knows what activities Mr. Mabbutt 
engaged in, at or around the time of this death. It is well 
settled that no one observed Mr. Mabbutt between 12:00 p.m. and 
4:30 p.m. when his body was found. (See Court Record, Volume II 
at 73; Volume II at 97-99.) Counsel for respondent did not offer 
expert testimony regarding mental stress. Thus, the best that 
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can be said is that Mr. Mabbutt worked under varying degrees of 
stress, like nearly every person who is employed in any capacity 
in our society and the Administrative Law Judge had no means by 
which to quantify the stress, if anyf that Mr. Mabbutt experi-
enced on the day he died. 
In her brief, respondent attempts to argue that Mr. 
Mabbutt was under stress due to the fact that he could not unclog 
the sump pump that was designed to pump the slurry from the block 
dam sump area to the belts. However, John 0'Green testified that 
the sump pumps sometimes became plugged (see Court Record, Volume 
III at 496) and that Mr. Mabbutt must have been successful in 
attempting to unclog the pump since we know that the pump was 
working when Mr. Mabbutt's body was found. That is a reasonable 
inference to make. (See Court Record, Volume I at 165.) In 
Steward, the court found that the activities that the claimant 
was engaged in on the day of his death were beyond his normal job 
duties and that they were abnormally strenuous. Because of this, 
the legal causation prong of Allen was satisfied in Steward. In 
the instant case, the legal causation test is not satisfied, 
because the Administrative Law Judge could only make unreasonable 
inferences totally unsupported by the evidence as to what activi-
ties Mr. Mabbutt was engaged in at the time of his death. 
Second, in Steward, the court held that there was 
medical evidence supporting the Administrative Law Judge's 
finding that the "precipitating cause" of death was due to the 
conditions of the claimant's employment. Slip op. at 2. Similar 
medical evidence is not present in the instant case. 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge in the 
instant case never uses the term "precipitating factor" to 
describe the relationship between Mr. Mabbutt's death and the 
conditions of Mr. Mabbutt's employment. Additionally, a review 
of the medical testimony on this subject demonstrates that all 
three medical doctors testified at the February 17, 1988 hearing 
that Mr. Mabbutt's work-related activities on the day of his 
death were a sufficient, but not a necessary, precipitant of his 
death. (See Dr. Perry's testimony, Court Record, Volume I at 
346-47; Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, Volume I at 360-61; and Dr. 
Fowles testimony, Volume I at 362.) 
The message of Steward is clear. Where an administra-
tive law judge is presented with (a) objective evidence of an 
employees' work activities and (b) medical testimony that estab-
lishes that those activities were the legal and medical cause of 
that employee's death, the death is compensable. Stewart pro-
vides an easy contrast to the paucity of evidence upon which the 
Administrative Law Judge has attempted to compensate Mrs. 
Mabbutt. 
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION IS BASED 
UPON IMPROPER FINDINGS OF FACT. 
In her brief, respondent argues that Mr. Mabbutt was 
using the muck bucket and shovel until his demise. (Respondent's 
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Brief at p. 16.) This assumption defies logic. In his testimony 
on July 7, 1987, John O'Green, the safety director responsible 
for the administration of safety and training at Price River Coal 
at the time of Mr. Mabbutt's death, testified that the sump pump 
was working at the time that Mr. Mabbuttfs body was found. (See 
Court Record, Volume I at 165.) Thus, given that the sump pump 
was working at the time of his death, Mr. Mabbutt surely would 
not have been shoveling and carrying buckets when he could have 
utilized the easier, more efficient, and usual method of removing 
muck from the area. 
Additionally, when Miller testified that the amount of 
muck in the sump area was of a sufficient size that it would have 
taken Mr. Mabbutt 50 trips, carrying two buckets each trip, to 
drain the sump area, it was clear that the testimony was merely 
an estimate: 
Q. Mr. Miller, when you estimate these 
100 buckets, you're just making a guess, 
aren't you? You haven't computed the volume 
of these buckets, have you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you haven't computed the volume 
of that sump area, have you? 
A. No. 
(See Court Record, Volume I at 135.) Given the facts as pre-
sented in the record, the Administrative Law Judge improperly 
relied upon Miller's testimony which is not supported by the 
evidence in the record. 
-in-
The only reasonable inference to be made, given Mr. 
Mabbutt's poor general state of health and given the nature of 
his job duties, is that Mr. Mabbutt used the pump to clean his 
work area. From the time he was last seen, around noon, until 
the time of his death, before 4:30 p.m., based on Mr. Miller's 
testimony of the amount of muck which had accumulated, there was 
not enough time left in his shift to carry 100 buckets of muck. 
Mr. Miller testified that there was a buildup of muck 
in Mr. Mabbutt's work area at 12:00 noon on the day that he died. 
(See Court Record, Volume I at 133-134.) No one saw Mr. Mabbutt 
from 12:00 noon until he was found at 4:29 p.m. (See Court 
Record, Volume II at 73; Volume II at 97-99.) However, Mr. 
0'Green testified that Mr. Mabbutt usually returned to the portal 
of the mine at 4:00 p.m. and it took him 20-25 minutes, by man 
trip, to get from the work area to the portal of the mine. (See 
Court Record, Volume III at 488.) Therefore, Mr. Mabbutt's death 
most likely took place before 3:45 p.m. because he would have 
caught a man trip at approximately 3:45 to insure that he was out 
of the mine by 4:00. Mr. O'Green also testified that the buildup 
of material had been almost entirely eliminated when Mr. 
Mabbutt's body was found. (See Court Record, Volume I at 
164-65.) Therefore, Mr. Mabbutt's work area was cleaned during 
his shift. 
If we are to believe that Mr. Mabbutt cleaned his work 
area by carrying 100 buckets of muck, then he would have had to 
make 50 trips, carrying two buckets each trip, in a little less 
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than 3 hours and 45 minutes. Even assuming that Mr. Mabbutt was 
carrying buckets of muck right up until the moment of his death 
(which is not a reasonable assumption based on the evidence that 
he was using a water hose at the time of his death), Mr. Mabbutt 
would have had only 4.7 minutes to complete each round trip with 
no rest in between trips. 
According to respondent's brief, to remove the muck by 
using buckets, Mr. Mabbutt would have been required, for each 
trip, to fill both buckets, carry them up a "steep 7% incline for 
approximately seventy feet," dump the buckets and carry them 
approximately seventy feet back to the work area. (Respondent's 
Brief at 12.) To believe that Mr. Mabbutt could make each trip 
(including filling both buckets with muck) in a little less than 
5 minutes, thus moving the entire volume of muck without stop-
ping, is to engage in the wildest speculation. This is not a 
reasonable inference, especially since Mr. Mabbutt weighed over 
200 pounds and had diabetes millitus, gout and atherosclerotic 
cardiovascular disease at the time of his death. (See Section 
II.B of Petitioners' Opening Brief, pp. 16-17.) Even more 
damaging to respondent's theory, is the fact that the sump pump 
was found in an operable condition when Mr. Mabbutt's body was 
found, and that use of the sump pump was the usual and easier way 
to clean the area. (See Court Record, Volume I at 164-65.) It 
simply is not reasonable to infer that Mr. Mabbutt cleaned his 
work area by transporting 100 buckets of muck to the belt drive 
or that he engaged in unusual exertion at the critical time on 
the day of his death. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, petitioners Price River Coal 
Company and CIGNA Insurance request that the Court review the 
Commission's May 23, 1988 decision denying Petitioners' Motion 
for Review and determine that respondent Marie T. Mabbutt is not 
entitled to an award of compensation because respondent has 
failed to meet her burden of proof. 
DATED this day of November, 1988. 
!ES M. ELEGANTE 
MICHAEL BAILEY 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioners-
Defendants Price River Coal 
Company and CIGNA Insurance 
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